Ubuntu · Windows · fail-closed egress

Give an AI agent
its own silo.

AgentSilo runs your AI coding agents in disposable, containerized silos — isolated desktop, isolated identity, policy-controlled network egress. A compromise inside a silo stays inside a silo.

what it does

Built for untrusted workloads

An actively tested implementation, not a proof of concept — and deliberately honest about what it does and does not protect against.

// isolation

Disposable silos

Each agent gets its own rootless container, unprivileged host identity, browser profile, and work directory. Destroy it and it's gone.

// egress

Fail-closed network policy

All traffic forced through an identity relay and CONNECT proxy. Allow-by-default or approval-required, per silo. Every decision audited.

// operations

Real lifecycle, not a demo

Create, start, attach, recover, restart, purge. A desktop operator UI with noVNC viewer and direct terminal attach to the agent.

architecture

Every hop is a boundary

Nothing inside a silo reaches your machine directly — and nowhere outside it without permission. The path down and out is deliberately narrow at every step.

you
Desktop app operator UI — Ubuntu · Windows
lifecycle · viewer · approvals
→
silo host — unprivileged identity
workspace service narrow API · fixed runtime arguments only
πpi silo
⌘codex silo
◫browser silo
→
egress — fail-closed
identity relaytags traffic to its silo
policy serviceallow · deny · ask — audited
internetapproved destinations only

Each silo is a disposable rootless container with its own Chromium desktop, work directory, and agent home. The Windows runtime is in progress — silos currently run on the Ubuntu host.

security stance

Defence in depth, honestly stated

AgentSilo is defence in depth, not a substitute for host patching or an independent VM/microVM boundary. It is security-sensitive software: the right answer is to deploy it only after reading what it protects against and what it does not.

Compromise of a silo must not — and is tested not to — grant access to your home directories, browser profiles, SSH keys, sudo, or any network destination outside the silo's policy.

Residual risk. Treat anything typed into a silo browser as visible to the agent. Never mount human home directories, session sockets, or privileged sockets into a silo.
Not a credential vault, not a VM. Secrets are injected as rootless Podman secrets at runtime and never stored in silo state — but the container is one layer of the boundary, not the whole boundary.

Read the security notes →